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BOOK REVIEWS 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, by Alasdair Macintyre. Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. Pp. xii, 420. $22.95. 
PHILIP L. QUINN, University of Notre Dame. 
The bulk of this large book is devoted to telling what is in effect a tale of three 
cities. They are classical Athens, papal Rome of the high middle ages, and 
Presbyterian Edinburgh of the Scottish Enlightenment. The tale is episodic. 
Each of its episodes involves the development of a tradition of moral inquiry 
focused on justice and practical reasoning. And the tale as a whole is carefully 
constructed with an eye to drawing from it philosophical morals for today. 
Aristotle is the hero of the first episode, supported by a cast of characters 
that includes Homer, Thucydides, Sophocles and Plato. The plot line turns 
on a dispute about how to extend the legacy of Homeric thought on justice. 
Aristotle's achievement is portrayed as linking justice and practical rational-
ity within the context of the polis. The polis, according to MacIntyre, is "the 
institution whose concern was, not with this or that particular good, but with 
human good as such, and not with desert or achievement in respect of par-
ticular practices, but with desert and achievement as such" (p. 34). A partic-
ular polis must therefore embody principles about how particular goods are 
to be ordered into a comprehensive way of life that constitutes the good for 
human beings; a polis cannot be neutral with respect to rival conceptions of 
the good. Justice, being concerned primarily with desert, is the norm by which 
the polis is ordered and lacks application apart from the polis. So neither can 
justice be neutral with respect to competing conceptions of the good. And 
since practical reasoning involves essentially claims about the good at stake 
for the agent in acting or not acting, the polis also fixes the context of 
intelligibility for practical rationality. 
The hero of the second episode is Aquinas, and the supp0l1ing cast is made 
up of such diverse figures as Cicero, St. Paul, Augustine and Pope Gregory VII. 
The plot hinges on a conflict between the Augustinian theological tradition and 
a revived Aristotelian philosophy. The achievement of Aquinas is depicted as 
overcoming the conflict by integrating Aristotelian elements into an Augustinian 
framework. MacIntyre takes pains to emphasize the ways in which the resulting 
Thomistic synthesis is at odds with deeply cherished beliefs of liberal modernity. 
Thus, for example, Aquinas holds that the Pope has legitimate authority over 
secular rulers because secular power is subject to spiritual power as the body 
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is subject to the soul. He also maintains that a just political order will include 
education into the virtues in the interest of the common good. Hence, MacI-
ntyre argues, "the modern liberal conception of government as securing a 
minimum order, within which individuals may pursue their own freely chosen 
ends, protected by and large from the moral interference of government, is 
also incompatible with Aquinas' account of a just order" (p. 201). And he 
also insists that the "standard commercial and financial practices of capital-
ism are as incompatible with Aquinas' conception of justice as are the stan-
dard practices of the kind of adversarial system of legal justice in which 
lawyers often defend those whom they know to be guilty" (p. 200). 
The third episode in MacIntyre's tale has no hero, but David Hume is its 
antihero. The supporting cast is composed of assorted Scottish worthies, most 
notably James Dalrymple (Viscount Stair) and Francis Hutcheson. The plot 
revolves around pressures toward Anglicization of distinctively Scottish in-
stitutions of religion, law and education. Hume's achievement is pictured as 
an anglicizing subversion. It was anglicizing because Hume articulated phil-
osophically the principles embodied in the thought and practice of the dom-
inant English social order. According to MacIntyre, it was a social order "in 
which passions and interests were, or rather were taken to be, organized so 
as to provide mutuality in satisfaction and benefit" (p. 214). And Hume's 
achievement was subversive because it consistently drew out the implications 
of the sentimental moral epistemology in terms of which Hutcheson had tried 
to justify the moral beliefs he inherited from Calvinism and scholastic Aris-
totelianism. The result was to put practical reason at the service of the pas-
sions and to focus justice on insuring systematic mutuality and reciprocity in 
their satisfaction. 
What are we to make of these three narratives? A full answer to this 
question would have to be based on a discussion of the details of MacIntyre's 
interpretations of Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume and others. But the space available 
in a brief review does not permit, and the limits of my own competence do not 
make me well suited to conduct, a discussion of this sort. So I shall confine 
myself to considering the more general philosophical lessons that MacIntyre 
hopes to teach by means of his narratives. They seem to me to be of two kinds. 
The first kind of lesson has to do with conceptions of justice and practical 
reasoning. On this score, MacIntyre emphasizes three distinct themes. One 
is pluralism. Disagreements among traditions of inquiry are not best ex-
plained by the hypothesis that they share a single conception of justice or 
practical reasoning. Rather different traditions of inquiry embody irreducibly 
diverse and often conflicting conceptions of justice and practical reasoning. 
Another theme is holism. Within traditions, conceptions of justice and con-
ceptions of practical reasoning are "closely linked" (p. ix). Moreover, this 
linkage also extends to conceptions of human psychology or theories of the 
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person and, in some cases at least, to other metaphysical or theological doc-
trines. And the third theme is contextualism. Premodern accounts of justice 
and practical reasoning such as those of Aristotle and Hume presuppose social 
contexts of fairly specific sorts. Thus, "Aristotle's presupposed social context 
is one in which evaluation is primarily in terms of the achievement of the 
ends of activity; Hume's is one in which evaluation is primarily in terms of 
the satisfaction of consumers" (p. 298). The claim here seems to be that those 
accounts would only be, or perhaps were only meant to be, applicable within 
or adequate to social contexts of the sorts they presuppose. In my opinion, 
MacIntyre's three narratives provide good illustrations of these themes. 
The second kind of lesson has to do with the higher-order methodological 
question of how the epistemic credentials of competing traditions of inquiry 
into questions about justice and practical reasoning are to be evaluated. Here 
Macintyre takes a controversial stand on the side of a traditionalist method-
ology. Early in the book he proclaims: "What the Enlightenment made us for 
the most part blind to and what we now need to recover is, so I shall argue, 
a conception according to which the standards of rational justification them-
selves emerge from and are part of a history in which they are vindicated by 
the way in which they transcend the limitations of and provide remedies for 
the defects of their predecessors within the history of that same tradition" (p. 
7). Or, to put things in a nutshell: "To justify is to narrate how the argument 
has gone so far" (p. 8). Within this complex methodological claim, two 
further themes may be distinguished. One is historicism. Justification pro-
ceeds by way of historical narrative. The other is internalism. Standards of 
justification are internal to and inseparable from particular intellectual and 
social traditions in which they are embodied. It is the historicist theme of 
Macintyre's methodology that explains why the bulk of the book is devoted 
to three narratives. It is the internalism that explains why critics of 
MacIntyre's earlier work, particularly his After Virtue, have charged it with 
having relativistic consequences. And it is from this methodological stance 
that MacIntyre launches what I take to be the two most important philosoph-
ical arguments of the book. One is, as one might expect, a defense against 
relativism; the other is, not surprisingly, an assault on modern liberalism. I 
shall consider these arguments in turn. 
The notion of tradition-bound rationality ingredient in MacIntyre's intemalism 
bears more than a superficial resemblance to the idea of paradigm-bound ratio-
nality characteristic of the views of Kuhn in philosophy of science. Though 
MacIntyre nowhere in the book mentions Kuhn, he makes use of arguments that 
are plainly Kuhnian in spirit. Thus, for example, Kuhn and Feyerabend had 
argued that observations cannot decide between rival scientific theories be-
cause there are no theory-neutral observations. Macintyre endorses a similar 
view. Speaking of the rivalry between Hume's claim that reason must be the 
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slave of the passions and the claim by Aristotle and Aquinas that reason can 
direct the passions, he maintains that examples of human action cannot settle 
the issue. This is because "there are no preconceptual or even pretheoretical 
data, and this entails that no set of examples of action, no matter how com-
prehensive, can provide a neutral court of appeal for decision between rival 
theories" (p. 333). Since Kuhn's critics had accused his views of having 
relativistic implications, it comes as no surprise to discover MacIntyre's 
critics making the same accusation. Nor is it surprising to find that there are 
analogies between MacIntyre's response and claims made about scientific 
research programs by Lakatos. 
MacIntyre takes the relativist challenge to amount to the claim that if 
standards of rationality are tradition-bound, then "no issue between contend-
ing traditions is rationally decidable" (p. 352). His response comes in two 
parts. The first is, in effect, an argument for the possibility of a rational 
decision in some cases of conflict. Just as a scientific research program may 
cease to make progress by its own lights, so also "it may happen to any 
tradition-constituted enquiry that by its own standards of progress it ceases 
to make progress" (p. 361). When a tradition thus becomes stagnant or sterile, 
it enters a period of what MacIntyre calls 'epistemological crisis.' One pos-
sible outcome of an epistemological crisis is the defeat of the tradition in 
crisis by an alien tradition. Defeat occurs provided the alien tradition can 
both construct an explanation, which is cogent and illuminating by the stan-
dards of the defeated tradition, of what it was that rendered the defeated 
tradition sterile or incoherent and furnish the resources to solve the problems 
that were intractable for the defeated tradition. 
But, of course, this is only one possibility. There is no guarantee that all 
conflicts between traditions can be resolved by defeat. Indeed, in the light of 
the historical record, it does not now even seem likely that the conflict 
between relatively robust traditions of moral inquiry such as those repre-
sented by Aristotle and Kant will at any time in the foreseeable future be 
resolved by the defeat of one by the other. As MacIntyre himself is quick to 
acknowledge, it is a matter of historical fact that "for very long periods 
traditions of very different kinds do indeed seem to coexist without any 
ability to bring their conflicts and disagreements to rational resolution: theo-
logical, metaphysical, moral, political, and scientific examples are not hard 
to find" (p. 366). So it is incumbent on MacIntyre to do more by way of 
responding to the relativist challenge. 
What he does is try to construct a dilemma for the relativist that will show 
it to be impossible for the challenge to have a rational basis. For the person 
who would issue the challenge "must during such period of time either be 
him or herself an inhabitant of one of the two or more rival traditions, owing 
allegiance to its standards of enquiry and employing them in his or her 
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reasoning, or be someone outside all of the traditions, him or herself tradi-
tionless" (pp. 366-67). In the former case, absent a severe epistemological 
crisis in the tradition in question, the person will be committed to its ratio-
nality and so precluded from mounting a rational challenge to it. In the latter 
case, because by hypothesis rationality is tradition-bound, the person will 
lack the wherewithal to mount any rational challenges. So, in neither case is 
there a real possibility that the relativist's challenge is itself rational. 
But this argument is unsound, for its major premise does not exhaust the 
possibilities. The neglected possibility is that the challenge is raised from 
within a rational tradition which is, so to speak, no party to the conflict. This 
is not just an abstract possibility in a culture like ours that is rich in sharply 
differentiated traditions of inquiry. Thus, for example, it is easy to imagine 
an inhabitant of the rational tradition of modern natural science mounting a 
relativist challenge to all traditions of moral inquiry. In fact, if I am not 
mistaken, this is a common occurrence. One way the argument might go is 
this. Because theories in natural science are empirically testable, rational 
convergence is at least a possibility. Either rival theories will differ in em-
pirical content, in which case it is possible in principle for experiment to 
decide between them, or they will be empirically equivalent, in which case 
they are not, appearances to the contrary, really rivals at all but alternative 
formulations of a single theory. But because moral theories are not empiri-
cally testable, rational convergence is not even a possibility. Hence there are 
bound to be at least some issues between contending moral traditions that are 
rationally undecidable. And so because such arguments can be constructed 
within a tradition of one kind to give rational support to relativism with 
respect to all the traditions of another kind, Macintyre's attempt to show that 
it is impossible for the relativist challenge to have a rational basis fails. Hence 
his position remains undefended against this type of local relativism. 
Let us tum now to MacIntyre's polemic against liberalism. What he wishes 
to challenge is the current "cultural and political hegemony of liberalism" (p. 
401). His strategy is to undermine this position of privilege by demoting 
liberalism to the status of just another tradition of moral inquiry with its own 
distinctive conceptions of justice and practical reasoning. He contends that a 
political order in which liberal justice and practical reasoning are embedded 
is "not neutral with respect to rival and conflicting theories of the human 
good" (p. 345). And he maintains that "the overriding good of liberalism is 
no more and no less than the continued sustenance of the liberal social and 
political order" (p. 345). 
I think both these claims are mistaken. To be sure, there is a liberal tradition 
of moral inquiry in whose history Kant and Mill have prominent roles, and 
there is a liberal conception of the human good in which such characteristics 
as individualism, autonomy and sincerity have an important place. However, 
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it is just because liberalism is an individualistic moral doctrine that social 
and political concerns cannot be, for liberals, the whole story about the human 
good or even of overriding importance in all circumstances. 
What is more, as John Rawls has recently shown, it is possible to argue for 
a liberal political order without presupposing any general moral conception 
and a fortiori without assuming the liberal conception of the human good. 
Such an argument begins with the recognition that a workable conception of 
political justice for a modern democratic state "must allow for a diversity of 
doctrines and the plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, con-
ceptions of the good affirmed by the members of existing democratic socie-
ties.'" Under such conditions of pluralism, a polis state would have to be, to 
a significant extent, a police state. And it seems that MacIntyre shares some-
thing like this recognition, for he takes it to have been a discovery of Europe's 
educated classes during and after the Wars of Religion following the Refor-
mation that "no appeal to any agreed conception of the good for human 
beings, either at the level of practice or of theory, was now possible" (p. 209). 
So the argument remains neutral with respect to competing conceptions of 
the good. It also applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself; it 
remains neutral on controversial questions in philosophical psychology and 
does not involve a metaphysical doctrine of the self. Neither Hume's bundle 
theory nor Kantian noumena may be presupposed. This is what Rawls is 
getting at when he speaks of justice as fairness as a conception that is polit-
ical, not metaphysical. The only appeal is to overlapping consensus, the hope 
that as a matter of fact the various philosophical and religious doctrines likely 
to persist in a more or less just constitutional democracy will turn out to have 
enough in common to permit a working agreement on fundamental questions 
of political justice. 
Of course such a consensus will be at best a contingent and rather fragile 
thing if it exists at all. But I think there is reason to hope that in the United 
States something close to such a consensus can be extended at least to the 
constitutional scheme of basic rights and liberties. I am encouraged in this 
hope by such things as the work of John Courtney Murray, which argues from 
within a Roman Catholic tradition of natural law morality for the legitimacy 
of the constitutional separation of church and state.2 Perhaps those arguments 
can serve to remind readers of this journal that Christians who quite properly 
dissent from the conception of the good for human beings embodied in secular 
liberal moral theory need not on that account consider themselves at odds 
with the liberal political culture of constitutional democracy. 
So, if I am right, MacIntyre's position remains undefended against local 
relativism and is unsuccessful in its assault on political liberalism. I conclude 
that Whose Justice? Which Rationality? fails to achieve two of its most 
important philosophical objectives. But I must confess that I found 
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MacIntyre's liberal-bashing provocative. Thus I recommend the book both 
for its rich historical narrative, which is interesting quite apart from the 
philosophical lessons MacIntyre tries to extract from it, and as a useful 
antidote to liberal complacency, which lingers in academic circles despite the 
fact that liberalism has fallen on hard times in the political arena. 
NOTES 
1. John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, Vol. 14, No.3 (Summer 1985), p. 225. 
2. John Courtney Murray, S.J., We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the 
American Proposition (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964). 
Thomistic Papers IV, edited by Leonard A. Kennedy. Houston: Center for 
Thomistic Studies, 1988.207 pp. $23.95 Cloth; $12.95 Paper. 
MICHAEL L PETERSON, Asbury College. 
This book is mandatory reading for those interested in the contemporary 
discussion of the epistemology of religion. Leonard Kennedy, editor of the 
previous two volumes in the Thomistic Papers series, has assembled a group 
of very capable Thomist scholars dedicated to the defense of Thomistic nat-
ural theology, which is criticized in Faith and Rationality (Plantinga and 
Wolterstorff, eds. 1983). In this spirited fourth volume of Thomistic Papers, 
"Thomistic epistemologists" Henry Veatch, Henri DuLac, Thomas Sullivan, 
Dennis McInerny, Richard Connell, Joseph Boyle, and Thomas Russman 
sally forth against the "Reformed Epistemologists" in Faith and Rationality. 
Most chapters in Thomistic Papers IV target the chapters in Faith and Ratio-
nality by Plantinga and Wolterstorff; one chapter scrutinizes Alston's work; 
a small part of one chapter comments briefly on one of Mavrodes' stories 
and a part on Marsden's work. This review discusses all of the chapters in 
the book, but gives slightly greater emphasis to those by Veatch, McInerny, 
and Boyle. 
Henry Veatch sets the stage for discussion by devoting most of his lengthy 
chapter to the analysis of Plantinga's piece "Reason and Belief in God." 
Veatch affirms at the outset the essential agreement between Thomistic and 
Reformed thinkers: that one chief aim of Christian philosophy is the exhibi-
tion of the rationality of the Christian faith. The great differences lie in how 
the two groups of scholars conceive of this project. 
